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Information systems and the Internet have facilitated the creation of used-product markets that feature adramatically wider selection, lower search costs, and lower prices than their brick-and-mortar counterparts
do. The increased viability of these used-product markets has caused concern among content creators and
distributors, notably the Association of American Publishers and Author’s Guild, who believe that used-product
markets will significantly cannibalize new product sales.
This proposition, while theoretically possible, is based on speculation as opposed to empirical evidence. In this
paper, we empirically analyze the degree to which used products cannibalize new-product sales for books—one
of the most prominent used-product categories sold online. To do this, we use a unique data set collected from
Amazon.com’s new and used book marketplaces to measure the degree to which used products cannibalize
new-product sales. We then use these estimates to measure the resulting first-order changes in publisher welfare
and consumer surplus.
Our analysis suggests that used books are poor substitutes for new books for most of Amazon’s customers.
The cross-price elasticity of new-book demand with respect to used-book prices is only 0.088. As a result, only
16% of used-book sales at Amazon cannibalize new-book purchases. The remaining 84% of used-book sales
apparently would not have occurred at Amazon’s new-book prices. Further, our estimates suggest that this
increase in book readership from Amazon’s used-book marketplace increases consumer surplus by approxi-
mately $67.21 million annually. This increase in consumer surplus, together with an estimated $45.05 million
loss in publisher welfare and a $65.76 million increase in Amazon’s profits, leads to an increase in total welfare
to society of approximately $87.92 million annually from the introduction of used-book markets at Amazon.com.
Key words : publisher welfare; retailer welfare; consumer surplus; price competition; used-books sales;
electronic markets
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1. Introduction
  as a leader in the bookselling industry, Amazon’s
[used book] sales practices can have a significantly
deleterious effect on new book sales. If your aggressive
promotion of used book sales becomes popular among
Amazon’s customers, this service will cut significantly
into sales of new titles, directly harming authors and
publishers.
—Author’s Guild and Association of American Pub-
lishers, open letter to Jeff Bezos (CEO Amazon.com),
dated April 9, 2002
We’ve found that our used books business does not
take business away from the sale of new books.
In fact, the opposite has happened. Offering customers
a lower-priced option causes them to visit our site
more frequently, which in turn leads to higher sales of
new books while encouraging customers to try authors
and genres they may not have otherwise tried. In addi-
tion, when a customer sells used books, it gives them
a budget to buy more new books.
—Jeff Bezos, open letter to Amazon.com’s used book-
sellers, dated April 14, 2002
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Globally networked information systems can
reduce the search and transaction costs for buyers
and sellers to locate and trade products (Bakos 1997),
and can thereby facilitate the creation of technology-
mediated electronic exchanges (Malone et al. 1987).
These exchanges allow sellers to easily reach a world-
wide market, and allow buyers to easily locate items
that frequently would be unavailable in traditional
physical stores.
Several papers in the literature have empirically
analyzed the impact of lower search costs on retailer-
level competition (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000,
Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001, Chevalier and Goolsbee
2003). In this paper, we empirically analyze the
impact of lower consumer search costs on product-level
competition—specifically, competition between new
and used books. The Internet facilitates the creation of
side-by-side new- and used-product markets, allow-
ing consumers shopping for new products to easily
locate competing used-product offers.
There is, of course, nothing new about the sale of
used products. In the United States, the First Sale Doc-
trine (17 U.S.C. §109) allows for the resale of copy-
righted works such as books, and used bookstores
are common in physical settings. Rather, electronic
exchanges alter the scale, scope, and efficiency of
what is possible with regard to the sale of used prod-
ucts. Thus, while brick-and-mortar bookstores have
high search costs, limited inventory capacity, lim-
ited geographical coverage, and relatively high prices,
IT-enabled markets for used books offer low search
costs, nearly unlimited (virtual) inventory capacity,
global coverage, and—through competition among
sellers—relatively low prices. These market charac-
teristics are clearly attractive for consumers. Internet
sales of used books made up an estimated 67% of
all used-book sales in 2004 (Wyatt 2005). This repre-
sents the highest Internet penetration for any physical
product category that we are aware of, and compares
to a penetration of only 12.7% for Internet sales of new
books.
These changes in used-book sales have also raised
concerns among publishers and authors. Groups
such as the Author’s Guild and the Association of
American Publishers reason that because authors and
publishers are only paid for the initial sale of a prod-
uct, the lower search costs, increased selection, and
lower prices of online used-book markets will canni-
balize new-book sales and cut significantly into both
publisher revenues and author royalty payments.
However, to date, the publishing industry has been
unable to precisely measure the degree to which
used books cannibalize new-book sales because key
sales data have been unobservable in online mar-
kets. For example, Tedeschi (2004) quotes Paul Aiken,
the Executive Director of the Author’s Guild, as say-
ing “[t]here has always been used-book sales, but it’s
always been a background noise sort of thing. Now
it’s right there next to the new book on Amazon    
We think it’s not good for the industry and it has an
effect, but we can’t measure it” (emphasis ours). Like-
wise, Kelly Gallagher, chairperson of the Book Indus-
try Study Group’s Research Committee, observes
“everybody has anecdotal evidence to show used
books’ cannibalization of new books, but we don’t
have any accurate numbers” (emphasis ours, Publishing
Trends 2004).
Therefore, the motivation of this study is to provide
direct empirical estimates of the degree to which used
books cannibalize new-book sales, and analysis of the
resulting impact on publisher welfare, consumer sur-
plus, and social welfare. Our paper contributes to the
literature in that, while a variety of analytic mod-
els have analyzed competition to new-product sales
from used-product markets, ours is the only paper
we are aware of to empirically analyze the elasticity
of new-product demand with respect to used-product
prices, and the resulting changes in new and used-
product sales and overall surplus. This analysis also
contributes to the literature by providing publishers
and industry analysts with a methodology to conduct
similar analyses based on data that can be readily col-
lected from Internet markets, which as noted above
is a capability publishers and content creators have
been lacking.
We use Amazon.com’s used-book market as our
setting to answer this question because it is one of
the most prominent used- and new-book market-
places online (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Brynjolfsson
and Smith 2000), and it lists new and used products
side by side on product pages. This creates a setting
where cannibalization is most likely to occur as new-
book purchasers can easily become aware of compet-
ing used-product offers. We use this market to collect
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a unique data set from Amazon.com’s new and used
marketplaces documenting prices and quantities sold
for new and used books. Our data cover two samples:
one collected from September 2002 to March 2003, and
one collected from April to July 2004. Together these
samples include 41,994 observations for 393 individ-
ual book titles.
Our data suggest that used books are not a strong
substitute for new books for most of Amazon’s
customers. The cross-price elasticity of demand for
new books with respect to used-book prices is only
0.088. As a result, only 16% of used-book sales
at Amazon cannibalize new-book purchases. The
remaining 84% of used-book sales apparently would
not have occurred at Amazon’s new-book prices.
This increased access to low-priced (used) book
titles increases consumer surplus by $67.21 million
annually. While much of the discussion of the value of
the Internet to consumers has revolved around lower
prices, consumers’ benefit from access to used-book
markets is nearly as large as consumers’ benefit from
access to lower prices on new books (Brynjolfsson
et al. 2003).1
With respect to retailer losses, our results show that
without raising prices, book publishers lose approxi-
mately $45.05 million annually in gross profit from the
presence of Amazon’s used-book markets. This rep-
resents approximately 0.3% of total publisher gross
profits in 2003.2 It is also important to note that this
figure does not take into account any secondary rev-
enue that might accrue to authors from increased
readership. Moreover, this number does not take into
account the possibility that publishers could raise
their prices on new books as a result of consumer
resale opportunities in the used marketplace (Ghose
et al. 2005).
We also note that the overall impact of used-book
markets on social welfare is overwhelmingly posi-
tive. The consumer surplus gains and producer sur-
plus losses, together with an estimated $65.76 million
1 Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) find that the consumer surplus gain
from access to low new-book prices on the Internet (versus brick-
and-mortar stores) is between $100.5 million and $103.3 million
annually.
2 The Book Industry Study Group (2004) places publisher revenue
at $26.0 billion dollars and Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) place publisher
gross margins at 60%.
increase in Amazon.com’s gross profit from the used-
book exchanges, suggest a net welfare gain to society
of approximately $87.92 million from these used-book
exchanges.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.
In §2, we discuss the literature relevant to our
present work. In §3, we develop an analytic model of
used-product markets to highlight the importance of
empirical measurements in determining the degree to
which used products cannibalize new-product sales.
In §4, we compare the characteristics of the brick-and-
mortar used-book market to the Internet used-book
market to show that the Internet may have a signifi-
cant effect on used-book sales. We describe our data
in §5 and present our empirical model and results
in §6. We discuss the implications of our results in §7.
2. Literature
Our research is related to different streams of extant
work. The first stream of relevant literature relates
to implications of concurrent availability of new and
used goods. The difficulty of maintaining monopoly
power on durable goods is due in part to the prob-
lem of time inconsistency first pointed out by Coase
(1972). Coase conjectured that if a firm were to exploit
its residual demand in future periods, then rational
consumers would anticipate this behavior and price
would rapidly fall to the competitive level. The inter-
relationship between the markets for new and used
goods was pointed out by Benjamin and Kormendi
(1974) and Liebowitz (1982). They argued that a
monopolist can maintain market power by restrict-
ing the used market. Using the textbook market as
an example, Miller (1974) suggests that the opening
of secondary markets will force publishers to increase
new-good prices to extract the maximum possible
profit from the onetime sale of a new good. Further
research in this area has shown that a monopolist can
avoid the commitment problem by leasing as opposed
to selling (Bulow 1982), and that depreciation reduces
the monopolist’s incentive to cut price (Bond and
Samuelson 1984). The main argument of these papers
is that secondhand markets need not hurt the man-
ufacturer because manufacturers will anticipate the
resale value of their product and will increase the
price of the new good accordingly.
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A more recent stream of the literature uses analytic
models to show that secondary markets also create
a substitution effect because new goods face com-
petition from used goods (Anderson and Ginsburgh
1994, Hendel and Lizzeri 1999). When considering
the impact of used-good markets in competitive new-
good markets, upstream suppliers such as book pub-
lishers can benefit from secondary markets under
some conditions, as shown by Ghose et al. (2005).
Recent empirical work in the context of used
goods has used aggregate data to show that text-
book sell-through—new sales as a proportion of total
sales—declines radically from 90% in the first year of
a textbook’s publication to 45% in the second year
and 10% in the third year (Greco 2005, pp. 185–186;
Greco et al. 2005). A more recent study also uses text-
book data to show that students are forward looking
when making their purchases—and that their value of
a textbook declines when the release of a new edition
will foreclose on the resale market for a new textbook
purchase (Chevalier and Goolsbee 2005).
A third stream of literature relevant to our study
is research developing techniques to estimate welfare
effects from the introduction of new goods. Classic
economic theory shows that if the price of an existing
good changes from p0 to p1, the resulting change in
welfare is given by how much the consumer would
pay, or would need to be paid, to be just as well off
after the price change as they were before the price
change. This measure corresponds to Hicks’ (1942)
compensating variation measure. To measure the wel-
fare change from the introduction of a new good,
Hausman (1997a) modifies Hick’s measure by using
the product’s “virtual price”—the price that would
set demand to zero—as p0 and the introductory price
as p1. This technique has been applied to measure
welfare gains for new goods ranging from Honeynut
Cheerios (Hausman 1997b) to increased product vari-
ety on the Internet (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). Related
techniques have also been used to analyze the welfare
impact from online auction sites (Bapna et al. 2005).
Finally, our research draws on the literature relat-
ing to competition on the Internet (e.g., Brynjolfsson
and Smith 2000, Clay et al. 2001, Baye et al. 2004), and
specifically the direct measurement of consumer price
sensitivity. Papers in this literature have shown that
BarnesandNoble.com seems to face much stronger
competition from Amazon.com than Amazon does
from Barnes & Noble (Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003).
Various papers in this literature have also analyzed
the own-price elasticity for offers listed at shopbots,
finding elasticity measures ranging from −6 to −10
for shopbots listing books (Brynjolfsson et al. 2004)
and PDAs (Baye et al. 2004) sold by differentiated
sellers to −50 for a shopbot listing computer mother-
boards and memory modules sold by undifferentiated
sellers. Elasticity measures at Internet shopbots are
relevant for our study because the display of informa-
tion at these services is comparable to the information
display in Amazon’s used-book marketplace.
3. Theoretic Analysis
In this section, we develop a model to analyze the
impact of secondary markets on welfare to publish-
ers, retailers, and consumers. Our model spans two
periods and consists of a single publisher, S selling
a new good through a retailer at a wholesale price
of w, to a unit mass of consumers. The book is new
when it is marketed in Period 1 and can be sold as
used in Period 2 when it undergoes some degrada-
tion in quality. The retailer opens a secondary (used
book) market where consumers can buy and sell used
goods. Whenever a consumer sells the used book, the
retailer gets a commission k per used good sold, while
the rest 1−k is the gain to the consumer. For exam-
ple, Amazon charges a 15% commission (as a fraction
of the used-book sale price) to each used book seller,
while the remaining 85% of the used-book sale price
goes to the consumer.
Further, let  be a consumer’s valuation for a good,
where  ∼ U
01. The type parameter  indicates a
consumer’s marginal valuation for quality. For any
given quality, a consumer with a higher  is willing
to pay more for the product than one with a lower .
Without loss of generality, let 1 denote the quality of
the new good and q denote the quality of the used
good, where 0 < q < 1; thus, q can be interpreted as
the degree of quality degradation of new book. If a
consumer purchases a book of quality q at price p, her
utility is U= q− p.
The game is modeled as a multistage game. First
the retailer chooses an optimal new good price given
the per-unit wholesale price w set by the supplier.
Then market forces determine the optimal price of
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used goods from clearance conditions. Finally, con-
sumers demand is realized. We consider a subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game using backward
induction.
3.1. No Secondary Electronic Market
We begin by modeling the case where only new goods
are sold in the marketplace. We denote the price of the
new good in the absence of a used-good market as PN .
Thus, consumers buy a new book as long as they get
positive surplus; i.e., as long as −PN > 0. Hence, the
demand for a new book is DNPN  = 1−  = 1− PN .
Under these conditions the profit of the publisher is,
S =DN ∗w= 1− PN w (1)
and profit to the retailer is
R =DN ∗ PN −w= 1− PN PN −w (2)
In equilibrium, the retailer maximizes this profit by
setting P ∗N = 1 + w/2. At this price, the publisher
makes a profit of S = w1 − w/2, while the total
profit of the retailer is
R=DN ∗PN−w= 1−PN PN−w=
1−w2
4
 (3)
Note from (1) that in equilibrium the publisher will
set w∗ = 1/2.
3.2. Retailer Establishes a Secondary
Electronic Market
The presence of a secondary market allows new-book
buyers to sell them later. Rational consumers take this
into account in their utility function in the buying
process. As a result, the retailer (and/or publisher)
should be able to sell the new book at a higher price.
This is the price-increase effect, as outlined in the prior
literature (e.g., Miller 1974, Swan 1980).
However, Waldman (1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri
(1999) argue that the used-book market also cre-
ates a substitution effect. The substitution effect arises
from the fact that new books face competition from
used books. Accordingly, some consumers who pre-
viously would have bought a new book will shift to
the used-book market, cannibalizing new-book sales.
The price-increase effect will increase publisher wel-
fare, while the cannibalization effect will decrease
Figure 1 Market Segmentation in the Presence of a Secondary
Electronic Market
1θ1θ2
Buy new and sellBuy usedBuy nothing
0
publisher welfare. The actual impact of used-book
markets on publisher welfare depends on the actual
elasticity and propensity to resell books observed in
the market.
Figure 1 describes the segmentation of the market
based on consumer types. Let PUN and PU denote the
new and used-book prices, respectively, in the pres-
ence of used-book markets. An artifact of secondary
markets is that not all consumers resell their used
books. There could be multiple reasons for some con-
sumers to hold on to their used book. For example,
not all consumers may be aware of the existence of
the used-book market, or the transactions and search
costs faced by some consumers could be sufficiently
large that they do not have an incentive to partici-
pate in the used-book markets. In short, the net util-
ity to some consumers from keeping the book might
exceed that from selling it. To account for this fact, we
assume that only a proportion  of new-good buyers
eventually sell their used goods.3 Hence, the expected
revenue from a used-book sale (which is equivalent to
1− kPU ) realized by consumers is 1− kPU , where
 ∈ 01 and the commission charged by retailers
for selling used books is k. Hence, the corresponding
expected utilities derived from various strategies are
as follows:
(i) Buy new good and sell it: − PUN +1− kPU .
(ii) Buy used good: q− PU .
(iii) Buy nothing: 0.
Thus, higher-valuation consumers buy new goods
and lower-valuation consumers wait and buy used
goods later. It is important to recognize that, in our
model, the number of consumers in these groups
emerges endogenously. This ensures that clearance
conditions will equalize demand and supply of used
goods at all times. The new profit of the publisher is
given by
US =DUNwU = 1− 1wU (4)
3 We do not model flows within the used-book markets, i.e., used-
book consumers who resell their used books.
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where DUN denotes the demand for new books in
the presence of used books. Similarly, profits for the
retailer can be written as
UR = DUN PUN −wU+DUPUk
= 1− 1PUN −wU+ 1− 2PUk (5)
Here the DU is demand for the used books. Note
that retailers, like Amazon, also enjoy the benefits of
increased used-book sales on its marketplace through
the commission k that it charges to used-book sellers.
This used-book demand effect is not available to pub-
lishers. Thus, in general, retailers are more likely to
benefit from used-book markets than publishers are.
By comparing (1) and (4), we get the publisher’s
loss/gains from the establishment of a used-book
market as
US −S = DUNwU −DNw
= DUN −DN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution effect
w+ wU −w︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price-increase effect
DUN  (6)
Similarly, for the retailer, the loss/gain from the estab-
lishment of the used-book market (after substituting
RU for PUN −wU and R for PN −w and comparing
(2) and (5)) is given by
UR −R = DUNRU −DNR+DUkPU
= DUN −DN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Substitution effect
R+ RU −R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price-increase effect
DUN
+ DUkPU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Used-book demand effect
 (7)
Thus, consistent with the prior literature, used-book
markets have two countervailing effects on publisher
welfare. On one hand, used books cannibalize the
sales of new books, reducing publisher welfare. On
the other hand, the presence of the used-book market
may lead to increased consumer willingness to pay
for new books, and as a result higher prices. Which
of these two effects dominates depends on the actual
behavior of customers in the market—notably, the
sensitivity of consumers to used-book prices, which
can be measured by the own- and cross-price elastic-
ities of demand observed in the market.4 However,
4 There may be other potential effects that can impinge on the out-
come as well (for example, the secondary market may provide more
while these effects have been well studied in the ana-
lytic literature, we are aware of no papers in the
empirical literature that have directly measured them.
Moreover, as noted above, direct estimates of the can-
nibalization of new books by used markets is a very
important—and currently unavailable—measure for
publishers and authors. Thus, a key contribution of
our research is to develop and implement a method-
ology for creating these measures.5
To do this, we note that the relevant prices and mar-
gins in (6) and (7) can typically be observed through
secondary sources. Likewise, recent research results
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2003) can shed light on Amazon’s
used-book sales DU . However, the substitution effect
cannot be measured directly. To measure this effect,
we note that under the standard definition of elastic-
ity = Q/PP/Q, the substitution effect can be
measured as
DUN −DN =Q=DN ××
PUN − PU
PUN
 (8)
This shows that measuring the cross-price elastic-
ity of new-book demand with respect to used-book
prices  is critical to being able to measure the sub-
stitution effect, and therefore the change in publisher
and retailer surplus. One contribution of our work is
implementing a methodology to measure this elastic-
ity in the context of Internet sales.
Thus, the key insight from this model is that the
extent of gains (and losses) critically depends on the
effects outlined in (6) and (7). However, the sub-
stitution effect, price-increase effect, and used-book
demand effects are inherently empirical in nature.
Therefore, the theoretical model provides us with
key measures that need to be quantified to assess
incentives for users to buy other new books). However, identifying
disaggregate individual effects (like customer heterogeneity) is not
possible in our setting due to lack of appropriate data, and this is
a limitation of our study.
5 In the appendix, we calculate optimal values of PU , PN , and
the profits of the retailer and publisher. This shows that for a
wide range of parameter values retailers tend to benefit from the
used-book markets, while the publishers tend to lose. Our model
does not consider competition between retailers and assumes spe-
cific functional forms for different parameters in the utility func-
tion, and the results should be interpreted in the context of these
assumptions.
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the benefits of used-book markets to different par-
ties involved in these transactions. Hence, in our
empirical analysis we estimate the extent of substi-
tution effect (or cannibalization effect) and extent of
used-book demand effect. With this information, we
then quantify the gains (and losses) to publishers and
retailers based on real-world data from an Internet
used-book market.
4. Analysis of Brick-and-Mortar vs.
Internet Used-Book Markets
As noted above, there is nothing new about the sale
of used books. Rather, what changes on the Internet is
a radical increase in the variety of used books offered
for sale, a radical decrease in the prices of these used
books, and a radical decrease in the associated search
costs for consumers to locate these used books. To
illustrate the magnitude of these changes, in June 2004
we generated a list of 30 randomly selected books
from the October 2002 Bowker’s Books in Print list-
ings, and 30 randomly selected books from the 2002
New York Times bestseller lists. These lists are useful
because they are old enough to include books that
would generally be available in physical bookstores,
and they contain a mix of popular and less popular
titles.
We searched for these books at Amazon.com and
found that at least one used copy was available for
each of the 60 books we sampled—even though 13
of the books were out of print and did not have
new copies available from Amazon itself. Moreover,
there was an average of 22.6 competing used-book
offers for each random book, and an average of 241.3
competing offers for each former New York Times
bestsellers. These multiple offers create competition
among sellers to lower their prices. As a result, the
random books have an average 40.1% discount off the
new-book list price and the former bestsellers have
an average 84.5% discount off list price. As a point
of comparison, Amazon’s new books had an average
9.1% and 30% discount off list price for these random
and former bestselling titles.
To understand how the used-title selection at
Amazon would compare to the selection of a typi-
cal brick-and-mortar used-book store, we searched the
catalogs of four brick-and-mortar used-book stores in
the Pittsburgh area advertising themselves as hav-
ing a “general selection.” Three of the four stores
did not carry any of the 60 books on our list. The
fourth, Eljay’s Used Books, carried none of the ran-
dom books and only six of the former bestsellers.
Moreover, Amazon’s used price was an average of
75% ($8.16) lower than the price at Eljay’s for these
six books.
As another point of comparison, we used
ABEbooks.com to search for the used-book store in
the United States with the widest selection of titles
in our sample. ABEbooks catalogs the inventory of
7,680 used-book sellers in the United States.6 Accord-
ing to ABEbooks’ listings, Powell’s Books of Portland,
Oregon, had the best selection of any of these 7,680
booksellers for the books in our sample—but still only
carried 11 of the 30 random titles and 29 of the 30 for-
mer bestsellers. Moreover, the used price at Amazon
averaged 38% ($4.93) lower than the Powell’s price
on the random books and 67% ($7.03) lower than the
Powell’s price on the former bestsellers.
Thus, a used-book shopper at Amazon.com would
have lower search costs to locate a book, significantly
larger selection (both in terms of availability and
the number of competing offers), and dramatically
lower prices than they are likely to find at their local
used-book store (even if they are fortunate enough
to live close to Powell’s Books in Portland). More-
over, because new and used books are listed side by
side in many Internet markets, new-book shoppers
can more easily become aware of used-book offerings
than they could in a typical brick-and-mortar book-
store, and might be tempted by the wide selection and
low prices to buy a used book instead of a new book.
Together, these factors may be what is driving the
penetration of used-book sales through the Internet
channel: used-book sales are growing at a rate of 30%
per year (Wyatt 2005) and accounted for 54.4% of all
used-book sales in 2003 (Siegel and Siegel 2004) and
67% of all used-book sales in 2004 (Wyatt 2005). As a
point of comparison, new-book sales on the Internet
accounted for only 12.7% of total book sales in 2003
(Rappaport 2004).
6 As a point of comparison, Siegel and Siegel (2004) estimate that
there are between 8,000 to 10,000 used-book sellers in the United
States.
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5. Data
Our data are compiled from publicly available infor-
mation on new- and used-book prices and sales ranks
at Amazon.com. The data are gathered using auto-
mated Perl scripts to access and parse HTML pages
downloaded from the retailer. The data were collected
in two separate samples. The first was collected over
a 180-day period from September 2002 to March 2003
and includes 273 individual book titles. This panel
of books includes an equal number of books from
each of five major categories—New York Times best
sellers, former New York Times bestsellers, Amazon
Computer bestsellers, best-selling textbooks, and new
and upcoming books. New York Times bestsellers were
selected at random from the current New York Times
list at the beginning of the sample and were replaced
as they were removed from the list. Former best-
sellers were selected at random from the full list of
books appearing in New York Times bestseller list-
ings in the year 1999. Computer bestsellers and new
and upcoming books were selected at random from
the respective list at Amazon.com. Finally, bestselling
textbooks were selected from the facultyonline.com
bestseller list.
In early 2004 Amazon.com added a new variable
to their XML data feed to developers, allowing us
to obtain accurate measures of their used-book sales
(which we describe in more detail below). At this
point, we created a similar sample of books, drawing
40 books from each of four categories: current best-
sellers, former bestsellers, new and upcoming, and
random. New and upcoming books were selected in
the same way as the first sample. Current and for-
mer bestsellers were drawn from the current list of
Amazon best-selling books and Amazon’s top-selling
books in 2002. Finally, random books were selected
at random from all Amazon.com titles listed in the
“browse” section (which we believe includes all titles
offered for sale by Amazon). In this sample, we
dropped 15 books (10 random titles and 5 former
bestsellers) that were out of print and therefore did
not have new Amazon prices. These data were col-
lected over an 85-day period from April to July 2004.
Our total data sample includes 41,994 observations of
393 titles.
For each sample, we collect data on the Amazon.
com sales rank and new-book price, and the book
prices charged by Amazon.com marketplace sellers.
Our marketplace data include the price, condition,
and seller rating for each used book listed for sale.
Book condition is self-reported by the seller and can
be either “like new,” “very good,” “good,” or “accept-
able.” We also collect the seller rating for each used
bookseller, which is a one to five-star measure of the
reported experiences of prior buyers with each seller.
In addition to these variables, in the second sam-
ple we were able to use Amazon’s XML data feed to
collect the number of used books sold. We do this by
using the unique product identifier for each product
listed in the used-book market. This unique identifier
was added to the XML feed sometime between March
2003 and April 2004, making it available only in the
second half of our sample. Using this product identi-
fier, we infer that a sale has occurred when an iden-
tifier that appeared in the previous collection period
does not appear in the current collection period’s
XML listings. We collected this data once every two
hours for books with a sales rank lower than 10,000,
and every six hours for all other titles. In our empiri-
cal estimates below, for sessions where multiple sales
are observed in-between two collection periods (11%
of the sessions in our sample), we assume that the
books were sold in order of price. This is consistent
with the strong preference we observe in our data
for low-priced books. To the extent that this assump-
tion is incorrect, it will inflate our estimates of the
own-price elasticity of used-book demand and mean
that our consumer surplus estimates represent a lower
bound on the true consumer surplus gain.
Finally, for the second sample, we collect the num-
ber of lifetime ratings for each seller at the start of
our data collection.7 From the number of lifetime rat-
ings, we generate two additional variables: a dummy
variable identifying when a particular seller has zero
lifetime ratings, and a dummy variable for the top
10 sellers in our sample on the basis of the most life-
time ratings.8 Table 1 lists summary statistics for our
7 This variable was constructed on April 13, 2005, one year after
the start of the collection of the second sample, by subtracting the
number of seller ratings over the most recent 365 days from their
lifetime number of seller ratings.
8 These were exclusively large, professional used-book sellers.
Powells.com and ABEbooks.com were the top two booksellers in
our list in terms of the most lifetime ratings.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Amazon rank 41,994 74,169 238,283 1 2,556,356
List price 41,994 3060 3005 599 29999
Amazon price 41,994 2404 2647 195 20999
Best “like new” 41,492 1516 2132 001 19425
used price
Best “very good” 33,517 1126 1841 001 20760
used price
Best “good” 31,939 1124 1642 001 20000
used price
Best “acceptable” 20,368 786 1570 001 22235
used price
Best used price 41,994 1314 1916 001 15195
(all conditions)
Seller rating 41,994 397 165 1 5
Count of used books 41,994 8115 13178 1 753
Days since release 41,994 71787 133694 1 21,235
data. All prices represent the lowest price for each
ISBN.
6. Results
6.1. Sales Rank to Quantity Calibration
Until recently, it was difficult to calculate the price
elasticity for products sold on the Internet because,
while the price of individual items could be readily
observed, the quantity sold was generally unobserv-
able. Two recent papers address this problem, pro-
viding a way to map the observable Amazon.com
sales rank to the corresponding number of books sold.
In both cases, the authors find a stable relationship
between the ordinal sales rank of a book and the car-
dinal number of sales, using roughly the following
Pareto relationship:
Quantity=  ·Rank (9)
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) calibrate this rela-
tionship using a creative and easily executed experi-
ment where the authors obtain a book with a known
number of weekly sales, purchase several copies of
the book in rapid succession from Amazon.com, and
track the Amazon sales rank before and shortly after
their purchase. Using these two points, they esti-
mate  = −0855.9 They also estimated this parame-
ter from similar sales-rank experiments conducted by
9 Note that the  reported by Chevalier and Goolsbee corresponds
to −1/.
Weingarten (2001) and Poynter (2000) as −0952 and
−0834, respectively.
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) calibrate this relationship
using data from a publisher mapping the Amazon
sales rank to the number of copies the publisher sold
to Amazon in the summer of 2001. The data include
weekly sales and rank observations for 321 books
with sales ranks ranging from 238 to 961,367. Using
these data, they estimate =−0871.
For the purposes of this paper, we will use the
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) estimate because it is based
on 861 data points as opposed to two data points in
the experiments; however, our results are not partic-
ularly sensitive to this choice versus one of the other
estimated parameter values.
Note that the  parameter will be stable over
time as long as customers’ relative tastes for popu-
lar and obscure books do not change. Increases in
sales over time (holding tastes constant) will only
shift the  parameter, a scaling parameter that does
not impact our elasticity calculations. Also note that
any shifts in customer preferences for new books that
resulted from the introduction of used-book market-
places would be incorporated into our parameter esti-
mate, as the sales-rank data used by both Chevalier
and Goolsbee (2003) and Brynjolfsson et al. (2003)
were gathered well after the December 2000 introduc-
tion of Amazon’s used marketplace.
We also empirically confirmed that during the time
of our study Amazon’s sales rank was calculated
based only on new-book sales, as opposed to new
and marketplace sales.10 To do this, we located a book
with a high sales rank and observed the rank of this
title over the course of several weeks. During our
observation period, the sales rank of the book var-
ied between 596,625 and 606,439, and based on the
movement of the rank, the book appeared to have
one sale every two weeks. Having established the ini-
tial rank of the book, we then listed five used books
for this title in Amazon’s used-book marketplace and
purchased them on Monday, October 23, 2002, using
five different Amazon.com buyer accounts. The sales
rank before we made the purchase was 599,352 and it
10 On or about October 14, 2004, Amazon changed the way it cal-
culates sales rank, and now appears to include both new and mar-
ketplace (e.g., used) sales in the sales-rank calculation.
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remained stable until October 30, when it increased to
601,457. On October 30, we purchased five copies of
the new book using the same Amazon accounts, and
the next morning the sales rank was 4,647. We infer
from this that marketplace sales were not included in
Amazon’s sales-rank figures during our study period.
(Note that, assuming this book had one sale every two
weeks at a rank of 599,352, our estimated  parameter
for this experiment would be −0877.)
6.2. Estimation
We run two regressions to analyze the structure of
Amazon’s new- and used-book marketplaces. First,
we analyze the impact of new and used prices on
new-book sales by estimating models of the form
LogRankbt = c+ ·LogAmazonPricebt
+ ·LogUsedPricebt+!′X+#bt (10)
where b and t index book and date. The dependant
variable is the log of rank. The independent vari-
ables are Amazon price (AmazonPrice), the lowest-
priced used book in the market (Used-Price), and a
vector of other control variables X. Our control
variables include the log of the time since the book
was released, the condition of the lowest-priced used
book, the seller rating for the lowest-priced used
book, and the log of the number of used books offered
for sale for a particular book.  ,  , and !′ are the
parameter vectors to be estimated.
Note that because of the structure of this indus-
try, quantity and price are not jointly determined, and
thus we do not face the endogeneity concerns that
would normally arise in demand regressions. With
regard to Amazon’s own price, because books are
produced in large printings prior to going to mar-
ket, the quantity of new books Amazon can sell is
predetermined (and usually virtually infinite) at the
time Amazon sets their price. Likewise, used price is
not a function of current-period sales at Amazon, as
used copies typically would take some time before
they enter the used-book market.11 This follows the
11 Note that book-level price changes for both new and used titles
appear to be uncorrelated with potential shifts in demand over
time. Also note that for each title in our sample, we include the
number of used books for sale in a given time period to control for
the supply of used books across time and within books.
standard approach taken in the literature for demand
estimation of Internet book sales (see, for example,
Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003).
For the second regression, we use the fact that
we observe each of the marketplace offers shown to
Amazon’s used-book customers along with the offer
each customer chose to purchase. Because of this,
we can use the multinomial logit model (Ben-Akiva
and Lerman 1985, Guadagni and Little 1983) to deter-
mine the sensitivity of customers to the parameters
of the offered products. Specifically, under the multi-
nomial logit model we assume that used-book cus-
tomers maximize an indirect utility function of the
form
uij = zj+ #ij (11)
where uij represents the utility of user i for offer j ,
which is a linear combination of the observed product
characteristics z and their associated parameters ,
and a mean zero random disturbance #ij . Under the
assumption that #ij follows a Type-I extreme value
distribution, if consumers select the offer that max-
imizes their utility, then the conditional probability
that offer j will be selected is given by a standard
multinomial logit equation
Pj =
expzj∑J
r=1 expzr
 (12)
Table 2 presents regression results of the impact of
new and used price on sales rank (Equation (10)). To
estimate this model, we use OLS with book-level fixed
effects.12 Models 1–4 in Table 2 progressively add con-
trol variables to check the stability of our parame-
ters of interest. Note that the parameters of interest
(Amazon and used prices) have the expected signs
(recall that an increase in sales rank implies a decrease
in sales), are precisely estimated, and the parameter
estimates and associated standard errors are stable
across specifications, suggesting that the estimates are
robust and that multicollinearity is not a significant
problem in the model.13
The other control variables suggest that, as
expected, sales of new books decrease over time, and
12 The use of book-level fixed effects is equivalent to a first-
differences approach.
13 We selected the minimum used price across all conditions
because this is the only used price shown on Amazon’s new-
book pages (see Figure 2). We are unable to include separate price
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Table 2 Results for New-Book Market
Indep. vars. 1 2 3 4
Constant −2059∗∗ −2067∗∗ −2078∗∗ −2161∗∗
0161 0161 0161 0162
Ln(Amazon price) 1347∗∗ 1347∗∗ 1347∗∗ 1345∗∗
0048 0048 0048 0048
Ln(min. used price) −0105∗∗ −0105∗∗ −0105∗∗ −0102∗∗
0010 0010 0010 0010
Ln(days since release) 1142∗∗ 1140∗∗ 1140∗∗ 1120∗∗
0015 0015 0015 0015
Condition rating 0009∗ 0.008 0.008
0004 0004 0004
Seller rating 0003 0003
0003 0003
Ln(number of used for sale) 0057∗∗
0011
No. of observations 41,994 41,994 41,994 41,994
Pseudo R2 0229 0229 0229 0228
Notes. The dependent variable is Ln(sales rank). Standard errors are listed in
parenthesis; ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 0.01 and 0.05, respectively. All
models use book-level fixed effects.
older books and books with more used copies for
sale have higher rank. It might be initially surpris-
ing that both seller rating and condition are insignif-
icant in our regressions. However, it is important to
realize that this does not necessarily mean that con-
dition and/or rating are unimportant to used-book
purchasers, but rather that the condition and rating
of the lowest-priced book are not what is driving the
cannibalization of new-book sales.
However, while condition and seller rating do not
appear to be driving the cannibalization of new-
book sales, they do have a strong impact on the
choices of used-book customers. This can be seen in
Table 3, which provides estimates of the taste parame-
ters ( in Equation (11)) for Amazon.com’s used-book
customers. These parameters are precisely estimated
and relatively stable across specifications. The signs
of the parameters suggest that, as expected, higher-
priced used books are less likely to be purchased,
and books in “very good” condition are preferred to
coefficients for each book condition because of collinearity among
these variables. Including a price coefficient for the lowest-priced
“like new” condition book—arguably the closest substitute to a
new book—would result in a coefficient estimate of −0069, lower
than the −0102 we obtain for the minimum used price across all
conditions. Using this coefficient instead of minimum price would
reduce the loss faced by publishers in our welfare calculations.
Table 3 Multinomial Choice Results for Used-Book Market
Indep. vars. 1 2 3 4 6
Used price −0055∗∗ −0054∗∗ −0054∗∗ −0055∗∗ −0055∗∗
0001 0001 0001 0001 0001
“Very good” 0210∗∗ 0191∗∗ 0184∗∗ 0184∗∗
condition 0/1 0011 0011 0011 0011
“Good” condition 0/1 0186∗∗ 0163∗∗ 0147∗∗ 0148∗∗
0015 0015 0015 0015
“Acceptable” 0095∗∗ 0068∗ 0053 0051
condition 0/1 0027 0027 0027 0027
Rating (1–5 stars) 0032∗∗ 0013∗∗ 0011∗∗
0003 0003 0004
Ln(lifetime ratings+ 1) 0014∗∗ 0008∗∗
0002 0002
Top 10 selling 0042∗
merchant 0/1 0017
No seller ratings 0/1 −0058∗
0023
Notes. The dependent variable is whether a used book is sold. Standard
errors are listed in parenthesis; ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 0.01 and 0.05,
respectively. We observe 9.8 million offers across 56,091 choice sets.
“good” condition books, which are in turn preferred
to “acceptable” books. It is surprising that each of
these conditions is preferred to “like new” condition
books, the referenced category. This could be driven
by the fact that used-book customers are very sen-
sitive to price and “like new” condition books carry
much higher prices than the other used-book cate-
gories. Finally, we see from Table 3 that seller char-
acteristics matter for customer choice. Sellers with
higher ratings and more lifetime ratings are preferred
to other sellers, sellers with at least one rating are
strongly preferred to sellers with no ratings, and the
top 10 sellers in our sample (who are exclusively
large professional book sellers) are preferred to other
sellers.
We can use the results of these two regressions to
calculate the relevant own- and cross-price elastici-
ties in the new and used markets. With respect to the
new market, one can easily show from (9) and (10)
that own- and cross-price elasticity are given by 
and  , respectively. Thus, using =−0871, we see
that Amazon’s own-price elasticity is approximately
−117, while the cross-price elasticity of new-book
sales to used-books prices is approximately 0.088.14
14 Cross-price elasticities for the old and new samples are 0.089 and
0.079, respectively. Own-price elasticities for the old and new sam-
ples are −116 and −140, respectively.
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Both results have the expected signs. Amazon’s own-
price elasticity is close to −1, which is consistent
with what one might expect from a firm with signifi-
cant market power. The cross-price elasticity estimates
are quite low, suggesting that used books are not a
strong substitute for new books for most of Amazon’s
customers.
To calculate the own-price elasticity of used-book
offers, we note that under the multinomial logit
model, the own-price elasticity of demand for an indi-
vidual offer is given by (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985,
p. 111):
jk = kpk1− Pj (13)
where k is the estimated parameter of used price,
pk is used price itself, and Pj is the conditional choice
probability defined in Equation (11). Using (13), we
can calculate the average own-price elasticity imputed
for offers in each session and take the average of this
across sessions to obtain an own-price elasticity of
−487.15
This elasticity, as expected, is high—suggesting that
the used-book marketplace is competitive and small
price changes have large impact on the probability of
a book being sold. Similar, although generally larger,
estimates for demand elasticities are also found by
other researchers in the context of shopbots—settings
where the layout of offers is very similar to Amazon’s
used-book marketplace.16 The fact that our elasticity
is slightly lower is likely due to the degree of differ-
entiation in offerings across the studies: In our study
both products (quality) and sellers (ratings) are differ-
entiated, while prior studies of shopbot elasticity were
conducted in the context of either undifferentiated
products (Brynjolfsson et al. 2004) or both undiffer-
entiated sellers and undifferentiated products (Ellison
and Ellison 2004).
15 Calculating elasticity at the session level as opposed to the offer
level is common in the literature, and we believe it is appropriate
in our case because it imputes less weight to sessions with a large
number of offers. The offer-level elasticity in our data is −414.
Using the offer-level elasticity instead of the session-level elastic-
ity would increase both the resulting consumer surplus and total
welfare in our results.
16 For example, Brynjolfsson et al. (2004) find elasticities of between
−675 and −977 for a shopbot listing new books; Baye et al. (2005)
find elasticity of approximately −6 in a market for PDAs listed
at a shopbot, and Ellison and Ellison (2001) estimate the elasticity
of −50 for DRAM memory modules.
6.3. Welfare Estimations
6.3.1. Publisher Welfare. As noted in §3, pub-
lishers are worse off in the presence of a used-
book marketplace if there is no increase in the price
of new books after the introduction of the used-
book markets. Conversations with representatives of
three major publishers revealed no changes in the
wholesale prices of books following the introduction
of Internet used-book marketplaces. Al Greco, the
author of the Book Industry Study Group’s annual
Book Industry Trends and a professor at Fordham Uni-
versity, confirmed that in his research there have been
“no significant changes in wholesale prices” in recent
years as a result of the introduction of used-book mar-
kets on the Internet.17 Because of this, we assume in
our welfare calculations that publisher prices have not
changed as a result of the introduction of Internet
exchanges for used books.18 Under this assumption,
we can use our elasticity estimates and Equation (8)
above to estimate the loss in publisher profit from the
presence of Amazon’s used-book market.
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) calculate that after the
introduction of the used marketplace Amazon sold
approximately 99.4 million books per year. How-
ever, this represents sales after the introduction of the
used-book marketplace DUN , not before DN . Thus,
we must rewrite (8) in terms of observed variables
(specifically DUN ), which gives us
Q = DUN −DN=DUN
 ·P%
1− ·P%
where P%=
(
PUN − Pu
PUN
)
 (14)
From our calculations above, the cross-price elasticity
of new-book sales to used-book prices  is approx-
imately 0.088. Finally, used books in our sample are
sold at an average discount of 50.6% off Amazon’s
new price P% = 0506. From these figures, Equa-
tion (14) shows that Amazon lost 4.63 million sales
Q due to the presence of used-book markets.
17 Source. Al Greco, Fordham University, May 12, 2005, conversa-
tion.
18 This is a conservative assumption. If it is incorrect, we will over-
state the publisher loss, and our resulting total welfare estimates
will represent a lower bound on the true welfare gains.
Ghose, Smith, and Telang: Internet Exchanges for Used Books
Information Systems Research 17(1), pp. 3–19, © 2006 INFORMS 15
We can use (6) to characterize the loss in publisher
profit from this change in sales by noting that accord-
ing to Brynjolfsson et al. (2003), the wholesale cost of
adult trade books is between 43%–51% off the book’s
list price, and publisher gross margins on sales are
typically 56%–64%. Then taking 60% as the typical
margin, 47% as the typical discount off list price for
wholesale prices, and noting that the average list price
in our sample is $30.60, we calculate that publisher
lost gross profit from Amazon.com’s used-book mar-
ket is approximately $45.05 million.19
6.3.2. Retailer Welfare. With regard to retailer
welfare, Amazon.com incurs a loss from the decrease
in the quantity of new books sold, which may be mit-
igated by an increase in revenue from used-book mar-
ketplace sales that otherwise would not have occurred
at the new-book prices. Because we observe Qn, Pn,
and the relevant cross-price elasticities, we can mea-
sure the net change in retailer welfare from these two
effects. To do this, we first calculate Amazon’s dol-
lar contribution margins on new and used books. For
new books, Wingfield (2003) places Amazon’s gross
margins on new-book sales at approximately 22%
which, given Amazon’s average price $24.04 for new
books, gives a dollar contribution margin of $5.29.
For used books, Amazon also earns revenue of
$0.99 plus 15% of the sale price on their used-book
sales.20 In addition, Amazon charges buyers $3.49 for
shipping and reimburses sellers $2.26 for their ship-
ping costs, and thus earns $1.23 on shipping per unit
sold. Given that the average price of used books in
our sample that are sold is $8.76,21 the dollar contri-
bution margin on used-book sales is approximately
19 $45.05 million= 4.63 million ∗ $3060 ∗ 1− 047 ∗ 060.
20 Amazon.com waives the $0.99 fee for “Pro Merchant Sub-
scribers.” Pro Merchant Subscribers are charged $19.99 per month
for membership. While we have no way of knowing how many
of Amazon’s sales come from these Pro Merchant Subscribers, we
assume it to be 50%. We believe this is a conservative assumption,
and it also ignores any additional revenue gains to Amazon from
Pro Merchant membership fees.
21 Note that the average used price that leads to a sale ($8.76) is less
than the average price of all used books listed in the marketplace
(Table 1), as one would expect. Also note that Amazon never takes
possession of the product, and thus revenue is approximately equal
to gross profit.
$3.04 (35%).22 Thus, Amazon’s losses on cannibalized
new-book sales net their gains on the corresponding
used-book sale work out to approximately ($225 =
$529 − $304 for each cannibalized new book, or a
total of $10.42 million for the 4.63 million cannibalized
new-book sales.
However, as noted above, Amazon also gains incre-
mental customers from the presence of their used
marketplaces. Our results suggest that these incre-
mental customers could be quite substantial. Milliot
(2002) notes that across all product categories sold
at Amazon.com, used products accounted for 23% of
Amazon’s sales. Moreover, used sales in the book cat-
egory were one of the strongest of any product cate-
gory, according to Jeffrey Bezos. Thus, 23% may be an
underestimate of the actual proportion of used sales
in the book category.
If Amazon sells 99.4 million new books annually
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2003) and used-book sales made
up 23% of total book sales (both new and used),
then approximately 29.69 million used books are sold
through Amazon’s marketplace annually. Recalling
that only 4.63 million of these sales cannibalized new-
book sales, we estimate that Amazon sold approx-
imately 25.06 million used-book copies that would
not otherwise have been sold new on the site. Said
another way, only 16% (4.63 million/29.69 million) of
Amazon’s used-book sales directly cannibalize new-
book sales. The remaining 84% of used-book sales
apparently would not have occurred at the new-book
prices on Amazon’s site. Using our figures above,
these additional 25.06 million used-book sales add
approximately $76.18 million to Amazon’s profitabil-
ity (25.06 million∗ $3.04/used sale). Thus, on balance,
the presence of Amazon’s used-book market added
$65.76 million to the company’s profitability.23
22 $304= $876 ∗ 015+ $099 ∗ 05+ $123.
23 It is important to note that this calculation of retailer surplus does
not include surplus that may accrue to used-book sellers. While
Amazon takes a commission of 15% of the sale price on products
sold through their marketplace, the remaining 85% of the sale goes
to the seller. Under the assumptions that 50% of marketplace sell-
ers are “Pro Merchant Subscribers,” and thus do not pay $0.99
to Amazon per sale, and that Amazon’s $2.26 payment to sell-
ers exactly covers their shipping costs, marketplace sellers make
approximately $206.4 million (29.69 million used books ∗ $876 ∗
85%− $099 ∗ 50%)) on the sale of used books through Amazon’s
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6.3.3. Consumer Surplus. To calculate the con-
sumer surplus gain from the introduction of Amazon’s
used-book markets, we apply the methodology of
Hausman and Leonard (2002) with respect to the con-
sumer surplus gain from the introduction of new
goods. Prior research has shown that income elastic-
ity can be ignored for consumer products that repre-
sent a small proportion of overall consumer expendi-
tures (e.g., Brynjolfsson 1995 in the context of com-
puter purchases, Hausman 1997a in the context of
telecommunications services, and Brynjolfsson et al.
2003 in the context of Internet book sales). Ignoring
income elasticity, the consumer surplus gain from the
introduction of the used-book market at Amazon.com
should be given by24
CV =− puqu
1+u
 (15)
where pu is the average price of used book sold, qu is
the number of used books sold, and u is the own-
price elasticity of used-book demand.
Given the used-book own-price elasticity of −487,
the average sale price of used books ($8.76), and the
quantity of used books sold (29.69 million), we esti-
mate that the consumer surplus gain from the intro-
duction of Amazon.com’s used-book market is $67.21
million.
7. Discussion
While many papers in the IT, economics, and mar-
keting literatures have analyzed the characteris-
tics of new books sold in electronic markets (e.g.,
Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Clay et al. 2001, Pan
et al. 2002, Baye et al. 2004), used books—and other
used products—sold in IT-enabled exchanges may
have an even larger impact on both electronic and
physical markets.
site. This almost certainly overestimates the true marketplace seller
surplus because many sellers would have a residual value of retain-
ing the product. However, whatever the actual seller surplus might
be, it likely represents another large source of social surplus from
these transactions. We thank Paul Kattuman for making this obser-
vation.
24 Note that if income elasticity were positive for books, as seems
likely, including income elasticity would increase our consumer
surplus estimates.
IT-enabled markets for used products are able to
aggregate supply and demand over a global market-
place, making it easier for buyers to find sellers and
for sellers to find buyers. Because of this, these mar-
kets have significant advantages in terms of price,
search costs, and selection over physical markets. As
noted above, while Amazon’s used-book marketplace
features at least one used book for almost every book
in print and many out-of-print books, a typical phys-
ical used-book store carries only between 5,000 to
30,000 unique titles. Likewise, prices of used books
sold on the Internet are 38%–75% lower than com-
parable prices in physical stores.25 Because of these
advantages, the Internet makes up an estimated 67%
of all used-book sales (Wyatt 2005), versus only 12.7%
of new-book sales in the same channel (Rappaport
2004).
The question remains: How will these IT-enabled
exchanges impact new-product sales and resulting
social welfare? The increased viability of used-
product sales in electronic markets may pose a sig-
nificant threat for many categories of information
goods—such as books, music, and movies—where
there is relatively little degradation in the quality of
the good over time, and where artists and publish-
ers are only compensated for the initial sale of the
product. In these product categories, the increased
variety, low prices, and low search costs available in
online used-product markets may attract customers
who would have otherwise purchased a new copy of
the product. If cannibalization of new-product sales
were to become widespread, it could undermine the
profitability of the publishing business and reduce
authors’ and artists’ creative incentives. Because of
this, the Association of American Publishers and the
Authors’ Guild have asked Amazon to create arti-
ficial search costs for new-book shoppers to locate
used-book copies by separating the two markets on
Amazon’s site.
In this research, we analyze the impact of used-
book markets on new-book sales at Amazon.com.
Using a unique data set, we find that the cross-price
elasticity of new-book sales with respect to used-
book prices is rather low (0.088). This means that
25 As a point of comparison, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that
new-book prices are only 15.5% lower online than in physical stores.
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only 16% of Amazon’s used-book sales directly can-
nibalize new-book purchases; the remaining 84% of
sales represent purchases that otherwise would not
have occurred at new-book prices. Thus, while can-
nibalized sales result in an estimated $45.05 million
loss to publishers annually, the total welfare gain to
society from this IT-enabled market is $87.92 million
annually after considering the $65.76 million gain in
Amazon.com’s gross profits and the $67.21 million
gain in consumer surplus.
The implication of this finding for publishers is
that, at least at present, used books do not appear
to be a strong substitute for new-book purchases
for most consumers. Further, any lost publisher rev-
enue from these used markets must be viewed in
the context of the many ways the Internet has
helped to increase new-book sales: by lowering
retail prices (while holding wholesale prices con-
stant) (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), increasing prod-
uct variety (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003), and providing
a sales channel to customers who do not have local
access to large bookstores (Brynjolfsson and Smith
2000). Finally, it is significant to note that the esti-
mated $45.05 million loss in annual gross profits rep-
resents only 0.3% of total publisher gross profits.
For authors, while the observed levels cannibaliza-
tion will lead to somewhat lower royalty payments,
authors may experience an additional, indirect gain
through additional readership from the 84% of used-
book sales that otherwise would not have occurred.
For example, authors may accrue some added income
from these additional readers through speaking fees,
licensing deals, or advances on future books. These
new readers may also buy new versions of subse-
quent releases by the same author(s). Further, used-
book markets could spur new-book sales due to an
increase in valuation from the possibility of resale
(Ghose et al. 2005).
However, book publishers, and producers of other
comparable information goods, should remain atten-
tive to potential changes in customer sensitivity
toward used products. In the book category, customer
sensitivity to used books may change over time as
customers gain comfort with the quality and reliabil-
ity of products sold in used markets. Likewise, pro-
ducers of products with a stronger digital component
than books should analyze the impact of cannibaliza-
tion by used products. We speculate that cannibaliza-
tion may be particularly acute for digital products,
such as CDs and DVDs. Higher cannibalization levels
might arise on the demand side because digital con-
tent typically does not degrade from use, reducing the
importance of quality differentiation. On the supply
side, most digital content (including CDs and DVDs)
can be easily copied (and thus effectively retained)
before they are resold, potentially making them more
likely to be introduced for resale by (unscrupulous)
sellers. In this regard, we believe that another key
contribution of our work is in providing an easily exe-
cuted methodology for product sellers and academic
researchers to analyze the impact of cannibalization
in other product categories.
It is also important to note that while cannibaliza-
tion can reduce revenue to publishers and content cre-
ators, information technology can also provide new
tools for controlling or eliminating used-product mar-
kets. For example, licensing restrictions can prohibit
the resale of some products purchased digitally (e.g.,
eBooks and music purchased through online music
stores) and can create rental markets under more
direct industry control (e.g., the older Divx and more
recent Flexplay movie formats). Issues surrounding
the viability and effectiveness of technology-enabled
control over used-product markets would make an
important area for future research.
Finally, there are several limitations of our study
deserving mention. First, our data come from a single
retailer. Future research could include data from other
used-book sellers such as ABEbooks or Half.com. Sec-
ond, our study focused only on used books. Future
studies may wish to look at other similar product cat-
egories, such as CDs and DVDs. Finally, our study
represents only a snapshot in the evolution of the
online used-book marketplace. Consumer sensitiv-
ity may change over time as consumers gain more
familiarity with used products sold through online
markets.
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Appendix
Recall the consumer utility functions in §3.2. By equating (i),
(ii) and (ii), (iii), we derive the two indifference points 1 =
PN − 1+1− kPU /1− q and 2 = PU/q, which define
the consumer market segments. By equating the demand of
used goods 1−2with the supply of used goods 1−1,
we get the market-clearing used-good price,
PU =
qPUN 1+−1− q
1−qk1+−− 2 
The retailer’s profit is then
R = 1− 1PUN −wU+ 1− 2kPU 
Substituting PU in the retailer’s profit equation and opti-
mizing with respect to PN , we get the optimal new-good
price,
PN =
(
1+wU1+q− k
+q[3+2q1− k+ 2wU +2q− k2q+wU − 1])
· 2+ 6+ 4q−1
and the used-good price
PU =
q1+1− k+ kq+wU
1+ 1+ 21− k+ 2kq 
These expressions enable us to derive the relevant profits
expressions for publisher and retailer as follows:
US = 1− 1w=
1
2
1+q−wUwU
1+q2+
and
UR =
1
4
1+q−wU2
1+q2+ 
The publisher can optimize its profit with respect to wU
and can set wU = 1/21+q. Without the used-book mar-
ket, the publisher makes a profit of S = w1−w/2 and
the retailer makes a profit of R = 1− w2/4. Comparing
these respective profits, it is easy to see that US −S < 0 for
all values of wU ,  and q and w is set at optimal w= 1/2.
On the other hand, UR − R > 0 for all wU < 1 + q −
1/2
√
1+2+q. Thus, as long as the publisher does
not increase its wholesale price, the retailer always bene-
fits and the publisher always loses. Note that for simplicity
we do not consider changes in retailer and wholesale prices
across time. The various effects of the secondary market we
have identified for publisher and retailer will still persist
even if we solved for first period retail and wholesale prices
separately.
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